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RETROACTIVE SENIORITY AS A REMEDY
FOR PAST DISCRIMINATION: FRANKS
v. BOWMAN TRANSPORTATION CO.
INTRODUCTION
Seniority systems have become a firmly entrenched employ-
ment practice in the United States' and are presently embodied in
virtually every collective bargaining agreement.2 An employee's ac-
cumulation of seniority determines a wide variety of employment
benefits 3 including promotions, vacations, wage increases, and over-
time opportunities.4 Moreover, job security, perhaps the most im-
portant function of seniority systems, becomes especially significant
in times of spiraling unemployment. During the current economic
slump with its resultant mass layoffs, seniority systems have been
subject to close scrutiny. Minorities with little or no seniority have
attacked seniority systems under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,1 alleging that were it not for past discrimination, they would
have acquired sufficient seniority to avert their layoffs. As a result
of these challenges, courts have been forced to determine whether
Title VII permits remedial action where, except for the effect of past
discrimination, seniority systems are clearly valid.
The Supreme Court in 1971 declared that under Title VII,
"practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neu-
I See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1209, ANALYSis OF LAYOFF,
RECALL, AND WORK-SHARING PROCEDURES n UNION CONTRACTS 19 (1957). The importance
presently attached to the use of seniority clauses in determining layoff procedures is illus-
trated by the results of a study of major collective bargaining agreements conducted by the
United States Department of Labor in 1970-1971. The Labor Department found that seniority
played some role in determining layoffs 99% of the time; it was a major factor 44% of the
time; and it played no role in determining layoffs in less than 1% of all agreements surveyed.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATIsTIcs, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-13, MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING AGREEMENTS: LAYOFF, RECALL, AND WORKSHARING PROCEDURES 54, table 11 (1972).
2 See Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75
HARV. L. REv. 1532, 1534 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Aaron]. Seniority provisions are found
in approximately 90% of all collective bargaining agreements entered into in the nation. See
BNA, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS (8th ed. 1975). The significance of this statistic is
indicated by the fact that an estimated 26 million workers are covered by collective bargain-
ing agreements. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL UNIONS
AND EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATIONS 88 (1974).
3 See S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & E. LivERNASH, THE IMPACT OF CoLLECTIE BARGAINING ON
MANAGEMENT 106-15 (1960); Stacy, Title VII Seniority Remedies in a Time of Economic
Downturn, 28 VAND. L. REv. 487, 490 (1975).
See Aaron, supra note 2, at 1535.
- 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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tral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to
'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment prac-
tices."6 Generally, the "last hired, first fired" provisions contained
in most seniority agreements are racially neutral and objective in
application to all employees.7 A problem arises, however, with mi-
nority workers who, because of a denial of employment opportuni-
ties in the past, are presently the employees with the least seniority.
In such instances, the application of a "last hired, first fired"
principle to determine the order of layoffs affects a disproportionate
number of minority workers.' Aggrieved minorities have claimed
that the application of seniority systems to layoffs perpetuates past
discrimination, and as such is violative of Title VII. Their demands
for the use of other methods for determining layoff schedules or for
the award of seniority retroactive to the date of their original
employment application have met with conflicting results among
the circuits.10 The Supreme Court recently confronted this issue in
' Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
7 See Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General
Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HAiv. L. RPv. 1598, 1603 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Cooper & Sobol]. See generally Aaron, supra note 2; Gould,
Employment Security, Seniority and Race: The Role of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 13 How. L.J. 1 (1967).
1 See Totenberg, Recession's Special Victims: Newly Hired Blacks, Women, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 9, 1975, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1, col. 7. A layoff of 2300 employees by General Motors
in its Fremont, California plant in January 1975 included practically all of the 500 women
who worked on the assembly line. These women were among the last hired and had been
precluded from attaining a more secure position on the company's seniority scale because of
the company's failure to hire women for assembly line jobs prior to 1968.
9 E.g., Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976); Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F.2d
939 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2215 (1976); Watkins v. USW Local 2369, 516 F.2d
41 (5th Cir. 1975); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir.
1975), vacated and remanded in light of Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2196
(1976); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 96 S.
Ct. 2214 (1976).
10 Compare Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976), and Meadows v. Ford Motor
Co., 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2215 (1976), with Jersey Cent. Power
& Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded in light
of Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2196 (1976), and Waters v. Wisconsin Steel
Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2214 (1976). In Acha v. Beame,
female police officers subject to prior police department discrimination in hiring and now
discharged pursuant to the "last hired, first fired" method of layoffs brought an action seeking
constructive seniority back to the date they would have been hired had there been no discrim-
ination. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided that the layoff of any female
police officer who, but for her sex, would have been hired early enough to accumulate suffi-
cient seniority to withstand the present layoffs is violative of Title Vii's prohibition against
sex discrimination. The defendants argued that the layoff procedure they utilized was pro-
tected as a "bona fide" seniority system under § 703(h), and that an award of constructive
seniority to the plaintiffs would be violative of that section. The court concluded that the
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Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,1" and held that retroactive
seniority may be awarded to identifiable applicants who were discri-
minatorily denied employment after the effective date of Title VII.
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.
In Franks, a class action 12 was instituted against an interstate
trucking company that had allegedly used various racially discrimi-
natory employment practices in violation of Title VII. The district
court found that the company had engaged in a pattern of racial
discrimination, particularly in its failure to hire blacks directly as
over-the-road (OTR) drivers (class 3 plaintiffs) and in hindering
blacks already employed in lower paying jobs from transferring or
being promoted to the OTR department (class 4 plaintiffs). In its
final remedial order, however, the district court declined to grant
backpay and retroactive seniority in the OTR department to the
members of classes 3 and 4.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
the district court had erred in denying backpay to members of both
classes 3 and 4, and vacated the judgment in that respect."
seniority system could not be considered "bona fide" until the past discrimination against
these female police officers is rectified by awarding them the seniority status which they
would have obtained absent discrimination. The Acha court also declared that retroactive
seniority is a remedial device included within the powers conferred upon the district courts
by § 706(g). Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Meadows, confronted
with the defendant employer's discriminatory hiring practices, held that Title VII does not
prohibit the grant of retroactive seniority and that the choice of remedies vests in the first
instance in the district court. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
in Jersey Central and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Waters held that a
facially neutral seniority system, even if it perpetuates the effects of past discrimination, is
"bona fide" within the scope of § 703(h). Concluding that last hired, first fired systems are
not violative of Title VII, the Third and Seventh Circuits declined to grant retroactive senior-
ity relief. See notes 27 & 28 infra.
1" 424 U.S. 747 (1976), rev'g 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974).
12 Petitioner Franks, a former employee of Bowman, brought an action against the truck-
ing company on behalf of himself and others similarly situated alleging discriminatory refusal
to promote, discriminatory discharge, and other racially discriminatory employment prac-
tices. Lee was permitted to intervene as plaintiff to press his individual claim against Bow-
man for a discriminatory refusal to hire and a discriminatory discharge and was permitted
to represent other classes of black Bowman employees and job applicants. The court subdi-
vided the petitioners into four classes: Classes 1 and 2 included black employees who had
been hired for menial tasks in lower-paying jobs and were prohibited or discouraged from
transferring to better departments; Class 3 was composed of all black applicants who applied
for positions as over-the-road drivers prior to January 1, 1972; Class 4 included all black
employees who applied to transfer to over-the-road driver positions prior to January 1, 1972.
The court concluded that Franks represented the first two classes and petitioner Lee repre-
sented classes 3 and 4. 495 F.2d at 412-13.
1S Id. at 421-22. The district court's denial of backpay was predicated on the following
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Furthermore, in accordance with well-established precedent," the
court of appeals directed that class 4 members be allowed to carry
over into the OTR department the full seniority they had earned in
other departments of the company. 5 However, the court affirmed
the district court's denial of any form of seniority relief to class 3
individuals, i.e., those black applicants who had applied only for
OTR positions and were refused a position in violation of Title VII,
grounds: First, in a rule 23(b)(2) class action, which traditionally involves injunctive and
declaratory relief, backpay is not warranted; and second, Title VII prohibits such an award
to unnamed class members. Id. at 421. Admittedly, rule 23(b)(2) speaks only to injunctive
or declaratory relief and" 'does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates
exclusively or predominately to money damages.'" Id. at 422, quoting FED. R. CrV. P.
23(b)(2), Advisory Committee Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966) (emphasis in original). The
court of appeals, however, posited that backpay awards under Title VII are not damages as
such, and that even if considered equivalent to damages under rule 23, backpay was not the
exclusive or predominant remedy sought in Franks. 495 F.2d at 422.
In response to the district court's second ground, the circuit court stated that Title VII
does not require each employee to file a complaint with the EEOC prior to joining the suit,
and that to hold otherwise would frustrate the central purposes of the Act. The court therefore
concluded that Title VII certainly does not preclude backpay awards to nonnamed class
members when only the named class representative has filed an appropriate EEOC charge.
495 F.2d at 422. See also Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
" In Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 919 (1970), the court, adhering to a distinction first articulated in Quarles v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968), distinguished between departmental or job-
line seniority systems and plantwide, or company, seniority systems. The former system
measures seniority by the amount of time an employee has worked on a certain job or within
a particular department. Upon transfer or promotion to a formerly all white department, the
employee loses the seniority accumulated in his previous position and starts over, earning
seniority credit based solely upon the amount of time worked in the new department. If a
company has discriminated against minorities by hiring them only for jobs in the lower paying
departments and has foreclosed the possibility of their being hired for more lucrative posi-
tions, a departmental seniority system operates to lock a discriminatee into an inferior posi-
tion by threatening him with loss of his accumulated seniority if he should transfer. Deciding
that facially neutral departmental seniority systems that perpetuate past discrimination are
violative of Title VII, and are not "bona fide" within the meaning of § 703(h), the Local 189
court ordered that the aggrieved minorities be allowed to use their accumulated plantwide
seniority status for purposes of transfer, promotion, and job security. Subsequently, courts
faced with challenges to a departmental seniority system operating within a previously segre-
gated employment situation have unanimously followed this precedent. See, e.g., United
Transp. Local 974 v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 532 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
1664 (1976); Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1975); Pettway v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974); Head v. Timken Roller Bearing
Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), petition for
cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). For a more thorough discussion of departmental senior-
ity systems, see Blumrosen, Seniority and Equal Employment Opportunity: A Glimmer of
Hope, 23 RUTGERs L. REv. 268, 275-80 (1969).
11 495 F.2d at 414-17.
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and who thus had no seniority with the company. 6 It was this aspect
of the Fifth Circuit's ruling-dealing with whether applicants who
had been denied employment in violation of Title VII after its effec-
tive date may be awarded seniority status retroactive to the dates
of their initial application-that had caused a clash among the cir-
cuits and prompted the Supreme Court to grant the petition for
certiorari in Franks.17
THE "BONA FIDE" EXCEPTION
The conflict among the circuits had been exacerbated by vary-
ing interpretations of section 703(h)"8 of Title VII, wherein Congress
granted "bona fide" seniority systems a limited exemption from the
general prohibitions of the Act. The Fifth Circuit in Franks
interpreted this section as a bar to the grant of seniority relief to
nonemployee discriminatees. 1 Although cognizant that the rejected
11 Id. at 417-18. In Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970), the Fifth Circuit, in dictum, drew a distinction between
"earned" and "fictional" seniority, declaring:
It is one thing for legislation to require the creation of fictional seniority for newly
hired Negroes, and quite another thing for it to require that time actually worked
in Negro jobs be given equal status with time worked in white jobs.
416 F.2d at 995 (dictum) (emphasis in original). In Franks, the court of appeals chose to follow
its earlier dictum.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has decried this distinction and the
concomitant denial of a remedy to blacks not previously hired. EEOC Decision No. 71-1447,
EEOC DECISIONS (CCH) 6217, at 4375 (1971). The Commission pointed out that blacks who
have been refused employment have suffered complete discrimination in contrast to the
partial discrimination suffered by those employed in the segregated departments. Viewed in
this light, it was the Commission's opinion that the goals of Title VII are poorly "effectuated
[if] a difference in legal consequence [is based] upon the thoroughness of the discrimi-
nation." Id., at 4376 n.10.
"' The company's petition for certiorari had been denied, 419 U.S. 1050 (1974), but the
Supreme Court granted certiorari on the NAACP Legal Defense Fund's cross application on
behalf of the class 3 members. 420 U.S. 989 (1975).
Is Section 703(h) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation,
or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system . . . provided that such differences are not the result of
an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (Supp. V 1975).
" 495 F.2d at 417. Contra, Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976); Meadows v. Ford
Motor Co., 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2215 (1976). The Acha court,
stating that under certain circumstances a seniority system can lose the protection afforded
a "bona fide" system under § 703(h), declared that "[u]ntil the past discrimination against
these particular plaintiffs is remedied by according them the seniority position to which they
are entitled, the system cannot be considered 'bona fide' . . . ." 531 F.2d at 655.
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black applicants had "suffered a wrong," the Fifth Circuit neverthe-
less held that section 703(h) does not permit a court to award discri-
minatees constructive seniority.2" It was the opinion of the court
that a discriminatory refusal to hire has no effect on the bona fides
of a seniority system. Consequently, despite prior discriminatory
refusals to hire, a seniority system which affords benefits and condi-
tions of employment to employees in strict accordance with length
of employment would not be considered an unlawful employment
practice.2 1 Characterizing such reasoning as clearly erroneous, the
Supreme Court asserted that the meaning and effect of section
703(h) can be properly ascertained only by a recognition that the
underlying legal wrong is not an allegedly discriminatory seniority
system, but rather the original racially discriminatory hiring sys-
tem .21
Prior judicial interpretation of section 703(h) had focused on its
legislative history, particularly on three memoranda 23 introduced by
Senator Clark in response to fears that Title VII would destroy
existing seniority systems. 24 One of these, the Clark-Case memoran-
dum, stated that: "Title VII would have no effect on established
seniority rights. Its effect is prospective and not retrospective."25 All
495 F.2d at 417.
21 Id. It should be noted, however, that Solicitor of Labor William J. Kilberg has stated:
There is general consensus that the Franks [court of appeals] decision, insofar as
it denied seniority to the individual plaintiff who proved that he suffered a discrimi-
natory refusal of employment, stretched [the bona fide seniority provisions of Title
VII] beyond its natural limits.
BNA, LABOR RELAnTONS YEARBOOK-1975 109-10 (1976). Moreover, in Chance v. Board of
Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976), Judge Oakes, confronted with the claim that the
application of a last hired, first fired principle to a seniority system perpetuated the effects
of the employer's prior discrimination in hiring supervisory personnel, stated that "it is
permissible to alter the 'bona fide' seniority system .. .even if that seniority system does
not itself independently constitute an unlawful employment practice. ... Id. at 1005
(Oakes, J., dissenting).
2 424 U.S. at 757-58.
' The three memoranda consisted of: (1) a Department of Justice memorandum written
at Senator Clark's request; (2) an interpretive memorandum of Title VII presented by Sena-
tors Clark and Case; and, (3) Senator Clark's memorandum in reply to questions posed by
Senator Dirksen. 110 CONG. REc. 7207, 7212-15, 7216-17 (1964).
24 See H.R. REP. No. 914,88th Cong., 1st Sess. 71-72 (1963); 110 CONG. REc. 486-87 (1964)
(remarks of Senator Hill).
' 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964). The memorandum continued:
If, for example, a collective bargaining contract provides that in the event of layoffs,
those who were hired last must be laid off first, such a provision would not be
affected in the least by title VII. This would be true even in the case where owing
to discrimination prior to the effective date of the title, white workers had more
seniority than Negroes. Title VII is directed at discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. It is perfectly clear that when a worker is laid off
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three documents support Senator Clark's statement that "it is clear
that the bill would not affect seniority rights at all." 6 Excerpts from
these memoranda had been quoted extensively by the Courts of
Appeals for the Third 7 and Sevenths Circuits to buttress a refusal
to afford retroactive seniority relief to plaintiffs seeking the status
they would have had but for the illegal discriminatory refusal to
hire.2"
or denied a chance for promotion because under established seniority rules he is
"low man on the totem pole" he is not being discriminated against because of his
race.
Id. at 7207.
28 Id. (remarks of Senator Clark).
2 See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687, 707-08 (3d Cir.
1975), vacated and remanded in light of Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2196 (1976).
Procedurally, Jersey Central was an unusual case. The employer, asserting that economic
circumstances required it to lay off substantial numbers of workers, sought a declaratory
judgment to determine whether it was obligated to allocate layoffs in reverse order of seniority
pursuant to a collective bargaining contract or whether it should adhere to the provisions of
a conciliation agreement with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission requiring the
employer to use reasonable efforts to increase its percentage of female and minority group
employees. The Commission argued that the purpose of the conciliation agreement would be
defeated by giving effect to the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining contract. The
court noted that the conciliation agreement neither contained any express seniority provisions
nor did it explicitly alter the layoff provisions of the collective bargaining contract. Having
concluded that the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining contract did not conflict
directly with the provisions of the conciliation agreement, the court proceeded to the eviden-
tiary consideration that layoffs in reverse order of seniority would produce a disproportionate
adverse effect on female and minority employment. The court posited that Congress intended
to prohibit proof of this "perpetuating" effect of a plantwide seniority system because it
regarded such system as bona fide, and allowed only evidence relevant to the bona fide
character of the system. After reviewing the legislative history of Title VII, the Jersey Central
court concluded that "a facially neutral company-wide seniority system, without more, is a
bona fide seniority system and will be sustained even though it may operate to the disadvan-
tage of females and minority groups as a result of past employment practices." 508 F.2d at
710 (emphasis in original).
21 See Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309, 1318-19 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 2214 (1976). In Waters, two black bricklayers brought an action against
Wisconsin Steel challenging its "last hired, first fired" seniority system as being violative of
Title VII because it allegedly perpetuated prior discriminatory policies and hiring practices.
The district court held that the "last hired, first fired" seniority system negiotated between
Wisconsin Steel and the bricklayer's union for the purpose of determining layoff and recall
had its genesis in a period of racial discrimination, and thus failed to qualify as a bona fide
seniority system within the ambit of § 703(h). Although it accepted the district court's finding
of discrimination, the court of appeals, relying strongly on the Clark-Case memoranda, re-
versed and held that defendant's seniority system was racially neutral, qualified as a bona
fide seniority system within the exemption of § 703(h), and in no way ,4iolated Title VII.
" See notes 27 & 28 supra. The Fifth Circuit in Franks, unlike the Third and Seventh
Circuits, did not engage in an examination of the legislative history while analyzing the effect
of § 703(h) on a seniority system. In reaching its conclusion that Bowman's seniority system
was protected by § 703(h), the Fifth Circuit was guided primarily by the "earned-fictional"
seniority distinction articulated by Judge Wisdom in Local 189, Papermakers v. United
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The Supreme Court,3 however, in accord with views advanced
by several commentators, 3' decided that the memoranda are not
dispositive of the meaning of section 703(h) .3 The history of the
section, 33 the absence of significant legislative background mate-
rial, 4 and the failure of the Congress to define "bona fide" 35 lend
States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970), discussed in note 16
supra.
30 Before reaching the merits of the case, the Supreme Court considered the threshold
issue of mootness. Bowman had allegedly discriminatorily refused to hire Lee, the sole named
class 3 plaintiff. After filing a complaint with the EEOC, Lee was hired by Bowman, but was
later discharged for cause. Consequently, he would not have been eligible for any hiring relief
granted to class 3 individuals. Bowman argued that since the named representative of the
class no longer had any personal stake in the outcome, the question whether nonemployee
discriminatees are entitled to retroactive seniority when hired pursuant to the district court
order was moot. The Franks Court decided that the mere fact that a "named plaintiff no
longer has a personal stake in the outcome of a certified class action [does not render] the
class action moot unless there remains an issue 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'
424 U.S. at 754, discussing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), and Board of School Comm'rs
v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975). The Franks Court held that in deciding whether to reach the
merits of an appeal, continuation of the named party's personal stake in the outcome of a
class action is a discretionary factor rather than a part of the "cases and controversies"
requirement imposed by article III of the Constitution. Thus, the only constitutional question
facing the Franks Court was whether the seniority issues remaining before the Court consti-
tuted a "live controversy". Deciding that the unnamed members of the class were entitled to
the relief already received by Lee, and to that extent an adversary relationship sufficient to
satisfy the "live controversy" requirement existed, the Supreme Court deemed Bowman's
mootness argument to be without merit.
31 See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 7, at 1611-14; Note, Last Hired, First Fired Seniority.
Layoffs, and Title VII: Questions of Liability and Remedy, 11 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 343,
369-71 (1975); Note, Last Hired, First Fired Layoffs and Title VII, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1544,
1548-52 (1975).
32 424 U.S. at 761-62. One commentator has suggested that this is not the first time the
Supreme Court has disregarded the legislative history of Title VII in cases where strict
adherence to that history would frustrate the essential purposes of the Act. Note, Last Hired.
First Fired Layoffs and Title VII, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1544, 1551-52 (1975). In Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), it was held that an employer could not require a high school
diploma or a certain score on an IQ test as a prerequisite to employment or promotion where
it was more difficult for blacks than whites to meet this requirement and where the possession
by employees of either qualification did not constitute a business necessity. The Court ig-
nored statements in the legislative history explicitly declaring that an employer could set
qualification standards as high as he wished even if it resulted in fewer blacks than whites
being promoted or employed. See Note, Last Hired, First Fired Layoffs and Title VII. 88
HARv. L. REv. 1544, 1551-52 & n.40 (1975).
3 Title VII, as originally passed by the House, made no express mention of seniority
systems. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1963). The subject arose during the
Senate debate on the bill, prompting Senators Clark and Case to prepare the so-called
Interpretive Memorandum. 110 CONG. REc. 7207, 7212-15, 7216-17 (1964). Finally, a compro-
mise bill containing § 703(h) was introduced by Senators Mansfield and Dirksen. Id. at
11,926, 11,931. For a well-documented, detailed analysis of the legislative history of Title VII,
see Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 431 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Vaas].
31 Unfortunately, § 703(h) was not the subject of a committee report, normally an
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credence to the view that the legislative history regarding the effect
of section 703(h) is markedly unclear.3 1 While declining to enunciate
the exact meaning and scope of section 703(h), the Court defini-
tively declared that "[t]here is no indication in the legislative ma-
terials that § 703(h) was intended to modify or restrict relief other-
wise appropriate once an illegal discriminatory practice occurring
after the effective date of the Act is proved."37 Since a discrimina-
tory refusal to hire had been proved in Franks, the Supreme Court
concluded that the Fifth Circuit had erred in deciding, as a matter
of law, that section 703(h) barred a grant of seniority relief to class
3 individuals.3 In so holding, the Franks Court removed one of the
major obstacles to an award of retroactive seniority. 9
THE "MAKE-WHOLE" REMEDY
Having first determined that retroactive seniority is not prohib-
ited by section 703(h), the Franks Court then turned to the crucial
issue of whether an award of retroactive seniority is appropriate
under the remedial provisions of Title VII, specifically section
706(g) .o That section grants the federal courts broad equitable pow-
invaluable aid in determining legislative intent. See generally Vaas, supra note 33.
See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 7, at 1614.
See, e.g., Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976), wherein Judge Feinberg, before
granting seniority credit to female police officers retroactive, not to the date of their appoint-
ment, but to the date they would have been appointed had the defendant not discriminated
against women, stated: "The legislative history of that section is sufficiently cloudy to war-
rant looking at Title VII's purposes and policies in interpreting section 703(h), rather than
just at the Clerk-Case [sic] Memorandum." Id. at 654.
424 U.S. at 761-62.
' Id. at 762.
It is interesting to note that subsequent to the Franks decision, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 96 S.Ct. 2214 (1976). The judgment of the Jersey Central court, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir.
1975), was vacated and remanded to the Third Circuit for further consideration in light of
the Franks holding. 96 S. Ct. 2196 (1976). The Third and Seventh Circuits had construed the
legislative history of Title VII as indicative of Congressional intent that a facially neutral
plantwide seniority system qualified as a bona fide seniority system within the ambit of §
703(h) even if the system perpetuated the effects of prior discrimination. Having character-
ized such systems as bona fide and concluded that, as such, those seniority systems should
be sustained, the Third and Seventh Circuits held that they were precluded from altering
the systems by awarding the plaintiffs retroactive seniority relief. See notes 27 & 28 supra.
11 Section 706(g) provides in pertinent part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court
may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice,
and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but
is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without backpay
...or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975).
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ers to design relief for persons aggrieved by an unlawful employment
practice. The legislative history of the 1972 amendments to Title
VII' indicates that Congress intended the courts to utilize their
equitable powers "to fashion the most complete relief possible...
to make the victims of unlawful employment discrimination whole
... *.,"42 Stressing the significance of the "make-whole" remedy,4 3
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated:
Adequate relief may well be denied in the absence of a seniority
remedy slotting the victim in that position in the seniority system
that would have been his had he been hired at the time of his
application. . . . [O]rdinarily such relief will be necessary to
achieve the "make whole" purposes of the Act."
The make-whole remedy advocated by the Franks majority
embraces the two functional aspects of seniority systems: competi-
tive status seniority and benefit seniority.4" Competitive status sen-
iority is utilized as the basis upon which limited benefits are allo-
cated among competing employees." An employee's right to keep
" Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103-13
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-6, 2000e-8 to 2000e-9, 2000e-13 to 2000e-14, 2000e-16
to 2000e-17 (Supp. V 1975)).
11 424 U.S. at 764, quoting 118 CONG. REC. 7166, 7168 (1972). For a discussion of the
legislative history of the amendments, see note 56infra.
,1 The "make-whole" remedy apparently evolved from the "rightful place" doctrine, a
theory first discussed in Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro.
80 HARV. L. REv. 1260 (1967). As propounded in that work, the "rightful place" remedy would
rectify the effects of prior discrimination by allowing incumbent blacks to bid for "white
openings" without losing any previously earned seniority, provided they meet the job qualifi-
cations. In the two leading departmental seniority cases, Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279
F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968), and Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970), the courts applied the "rightful place"
doctrine. Subsequently, other courts confronted with these issues have adopted the same
approach. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974);
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 489 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. N.L. Indus.,
Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), petition
for cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). It should be noted that these cases all involved
departmental seniority systems; rarely have the courts applied the "rightful place" doctrine
to a company or plantwide seniority system. The Franks decision, however, has established
that this doctrine should be so invoked.
" 424 U.S. at 764-65.
For a more detailed discussion of this dual concept of seniority, see S. SLICHTER, J.
HEALY & E. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIvE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT 104-15 (1960).
" In Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964), the Supreme Court observed that compre-
hensive seniority, which affects such benefits and options as promotion, demotion, order of
layoff, and order of recall, "has become of overriding importance, and one of its major
functions is to determine who gets or who keeps an available job." Id. at 346-47. See also
Aaron, supra note 2 (competitive seniority affects an employee's economic security more than
any other provision of the collective bargaining agreement).
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his job while another worker is laid off or the opportunity to obtain
a promotion to a higher paying position are among the many privi-
leges governed by competitive status seniority. Benefit seniority, on
the other hand, is utilized to determine noncompetitive or "fringe"
benefits earned under the employment contract, such as pension
rights, length of vacation, scope of insurance coverage and
unemployment benefits." The Franks majority reasoned that if the
victim of racial discrimination is to achieve his "rightful place," an
award of retroactive seniority normally must involve alteration of
both aspects of seniority status. Furthermore, according to the
Court, such relief should not be denied merely because the rights of
other employees will undergo alteration as a result.48
The three dissenting Justices in Franks assailed this aspect of
the majority approach. Chief Justice Burger argued in a separate
dissent that although retroactive benefit seniority relief may be ap-
propriate, traditional equitable principles preclude the award of
competitive seniority relief at the expense of innocent employees.49
An award of retroactive benefit seniority, like a backpay award,"
burdens the employer without affecting in any way the rights and
privileges of other employees, whereas a grant of competitive senior-
ity causes an immediate restructuring of the ranks of all employees
on the competitive status scale. For example, a white employee who
had worked for five years and thus had been protected against layoff
until those with less than five years seniority had first been dis-
missed would suddenly become more vulnerable to layoff if minori-
ties who had been discriminatorily denied employment in 1969 were
accorded six years seniority credit upon being hired to fill a vacancy
in 1976. Comparing the innocent employee who had obtained his job
and continued his employment without knowledge or approval of
the employer's unlawful discriminatory practices to a "holder in due
course" of negotiable paper or a bona fide purchaser of real property
17 See Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1260, 1263 n.23 (1967).
" 424 U.S. at 774-75.
Id. at 780-81 (Burger, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
Backpay is the only remedy specifically enumerated in § 706(g). Presently there exists
a strong presumption, as evidenced by the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), that "given a finding of unlawful discrimination, backpay
should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central
statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons
whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination." Id. at 421. To prevent the backpay
liability of a defendant employer or union from reaching exorbitant proportions, Congress
restricted such liability to a maximum of two years' backpay. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp.
V 1975).
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without notice of any defect in the seller's title," Chief Justice
Burger argued that the protection and preservation of status ac-
corded the two latter parties should also be given to the innocent
employee.12 This argument, however, has recently received little
support from commentators, most of whom contend that seniority
status is more properly viewed as a modifiable right or privilege
conferred by the employment agreement.5 3 As such, seniority rights
are not deemed to be indefeasibly vested,54 and are subject to modi-
424 U.S. at 781 (Burger, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
52 Id. Chief Justice Burger also commented that granting minorities retroactive competi-
tive seniority is analogous to "'robbing Peter to pay Paul' ". Id. When considering methods
of relief to remedy discrimination, courts have often expressed concern about inequitable
reverse discrimination. Although it is most frequently invoked in cases involving imposition
of racial quotas, certain courts have utilized this concern to combat the award of fictional
seniority. In Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970), the court stated:
No doubt, Congress, to prevent "reverse discrimination" meant to protect certain
seniority rights that could not have existed but for previous racial discrimination.
For example a Negro who had been rejected by an employer on racial grounds before
passage of the Act could not, after being hired, claim to outrank whites who had
been hired before him but after his original rejection, even though the Negro might
have had senior status but for the past discrimination.
Id. at 994 (dictum). However, as Judge Oakes in Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d
993 (2d Cir. 1976), cautioned:
Complaints of reverse discrimination have to be evaluated constitutionally with
careful regard to the facts of each case, since any affirmative action to correct past
discriminatory practices may result in what seems to be unfairness to those who
have benefited by those practices. The complaint of "reverse discrimination"
should not be allowed to obscure the need for action to be taken to reverse, or
negate, the effects of unlawful discrimination found to exist, as in this case.
Id. at 1003. Judge Oakes' observation is in accord with the spirit of the legislative history
surrounding the 1972 amendments to § 706(g), see note 56 infra, and may be said to have
foreshadowed the underlying rationale of the Supreme Court decision in Franks.
See, e.g., Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80
HARv. L. REv. 1260, 1263-64 (1967), wherein the author characterizes seniority rights as "legal
rights only in a limited sense" since they "derive solely from the provisions of collective
bargaining agreements" which may be changed at any time by the union and employer. But
see DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), May 29, 1974, at C-3, quoted in Stacy, Title VII Seniority
Remedies in a Time of Economic Downturn, 28 VAND. L. REv. 487, 512 (1975), wherein
Solicitor of Labor William J. Kilberg stated:
A man has ceitain property rights in his present job and, in order to take this away
from him, you should be able to say more than, "The company in years past
discriminated against another worker and therefore we are going to take your job
away from you."
11 Two of the most frequently cited law review articles on seniority rights and Title VII,
Aaron, supra note 2, at 1540-41 (1962), and Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and
the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1260, 1263-64 (1967), advance the proposition that
seniority rights do not vest. These commentators have arrived at this conclusion by reasoning
that since seniority rights originate in collective bargaining agreements which can readily be
altered by an employer or union, and since the occurrence of certain contingencies such as
loss of business or market upheaval can prevent an employee from obtaining a promotion to
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fication by the courts. 5
Chief Justice Burger's major contention-that the failure to
distinguish between competitive status and benefit status seniority,
and the required alteration of both types in a remedial order can
rarely, if ever, be equitable-was further elaborated in a dissenting
opinion authored by Justice Powell and concurred in by Justice
Rehnquist. Although fully in accord with the majority's assertion
that the broad language of section 706(g) and the accompanying
1972 legislative history56 support a directive to the district courts to
grant "make-whole" relief, Justice Powell noted that there is noth-
ing in either of those sources requiring the district courts to "disre-
gard normal equitable considerations"57 when implementing the
make-whole objective. Justice Powell contended that by holding
that the district courts may not consider the countervailing interests
of white employees, the Franks majority has at least partially
divested those courts of the equitable powers granted to them by
Congress.
Arguably, the award of retroactive competitive seniority more
fully effectuates the make-whole objective than does the award of
benefit seniority only. Yet Justice Powell contends, and his position
is certainly a viable one, that such an award extends the make-
which his seniority rights would have otherwise entitled him, those rights are little more than
a hope or expectation.
In the departmental seniority cases, courts have found the reasoning of the commenta-
tors mentioned in note 54 supra persuasive, and thus have permitted blacks to use their
departmental seniority status on a plantwide basis without expressing any undue concern for
the adverse effect that the remedy produces on the seniority rights of incumbent whites. See,
e.g., United Transp. Local 974 v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 532 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 1664 (1976); Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
" Evincing an increased awareness of the operation of seniority systems, and citing with
approval the judicial renderings in the early seniority cases, the legislative history underlying
the 1972 amendments to Title VII, see note 41 supra, reinforces the intent of Congress to
prohibit or modify seniority systems which perpetuate the effects of past discrimination. The
report to the Senate by the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare states:
In 1964, employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series of isolated and
distinguishable events. ...
Employment discrimination as viewed today is a far more complex and perva-
sive phenomenon. Experts familiar with the subject now generally describe the
problem in terms of "systems" and "effects" rather than simply intentional wrongs,
and the literature on the subject is replete with discussions of, for example, the
mechanics of seniority and lines of progression, perpetuation of the present effect
of pre-act discriminatory practices through various institutional devices, and test-
ing and validation requirements.
S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. at 5 (1971) (footnote omitted).
11 424 U.S. at 785 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
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whole objective to its limits.5s Retroactive benefit seniority, like
backpay, 5 aids in making the victim of discrimination whole with-
out adversely affecting other employees. It simultaneously burdens
the employer who has perpetrated the unlawful discrimination and,
hopefully, deters him from engaging in such practices in the future. 0
Retroactive competitive status seniority, on the other hand, furthers
the make-whole objective, but normally has no direct effect on the
employer." Rather, it results in the relinquishment by innocent
11 Id. at 782. Related to this issue was another argument advanced by Justice Powell in
which he contended that granting retroactive seniority to nonemployee discriminatees consti-
tuted preferential treatment based on a fiction. Id. at 792-93. Title VII contains an express
prohibition against preferential treatment:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer
• . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of
the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on
account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or
percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed
by any employer . . . in comparison with the total number of [sic] percentage of
persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State,
section, or other area, or in the available workforce ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970). One of the earliest interpretations of this section was expressed
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), wherein the Court stated:
[Tihe Act does not command that any person be hired simply because he was
formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority
group. Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely
and only what Congress has proscribed.
Id. at 430-31.
Although Justice Powell openly acknowledged that "[a] grant of competitive seniority
to an identifiable victim of discrimination is not the kind of preferential treatment forbidden
by § 703(j)," 424 U.S. at 792 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting), he did conclude that
such relief would, nonetheless, be preferential. Consequently, Justice Powell urged the Court
to pause before ordering district courts to create any preference, even one not barred by
§ 703(j). Id. Despite confusion concerning precisely what preferential treatment § 703(j)
prohibits, it is widely accepted that "the present correction of past discrimination is not
preferential treatment." Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 250 (10th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971) (citation omitted); accord, United States v. Lathers
Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 412-13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
11 Justice Powell noted that "[b]ackpay furthers the 'make-whole' purpose of the sta-
tute by replacing some of the economic loss suffered as a result of the employer's wrong-
doing." 424 U.S. at 784 n.2 (citations omitted).
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), the Supreme Court noted the
deterrent effect of the backpay award:
If employers faced only the prospect of an injunctive order, they would have little
incentive to shun practices of dubious legality. It is the reasonably certain prospect
of a backpay award that "provide[s] the spur or catalyst which causes employers
and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to
endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and
ignominious page in this country's history."
Id. at 417-18, quoting United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973).
" The Franks majority did refer, however, to the possibility of remedial action by the
district courts to shift the burden of past discrimination to the employer even when dealing
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employees of certain economic advantages acquired through periods
of satisfactory service.62 It was this very reason-that an award of
retroactive competitive status seniority would directly impinge
upon the rights and expectations of perfectly innocent employ-
ees 5-that prompted the dissent to conclude that retroactive com-
petitive status seniority, while always available, will not always be
an appropriate remedy. 4 According to Justice Powell, proper exer-
cise of equitable jurisdiction cannot occur in the absence of a bal-
anced consideration of both the claims of the discrimination victims
with competitive status benefits. For example, the district court could order the employer to
compensate each innocent employee who would otherwise bear some of the burden of past
discrimination. Since this issue was not before the Court in Franks, the majority declined to
resolve it. 424 U.S. at 777 n.38. Subsequent to the Supreme Court decision, a federal district
court, in McAleer v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 416 F. Supp. 435 (D.C. Cir. 1976), had the
opportunity to pass upon the question left unanswered by Franks. Plaintiff McAleer was
denied a promotion he was entitled to under the provisions of a collective bargaining contract
because the job was given to a less qualified, less senior female in accordance with a previous
consent decree that obligated AT&T to favor women regardless of seniority to eliminate past
sex discrimination. McAleer, standing as an innocent employee who was disadvantaged as a
result of AT&T's attempt to rectify its past discrimination against women, brought an action
under Title VII seeking both promotion and damages. Denying the claim for promotion, the
court stated that the consent decree had definitively established the woman's right to the job,
and, citing Franks, it declared that to hold otherwise would result in the perpetuation of the
discrimination that the consent decree was designed to eliminate. Significantly, however, the
court held that McAleer was entitled to monetary damages. Agreeing with the Franks recogni-
tion that discriminatees and innocent employees alike must share the burden of past discrimi-
nation, the McAleer court stated that there was "no reason why in equitably distributing the
burden among the concerned parties the onus should be shifted from the employer respon-
sible for the discrimination to the blameless third-party employee any more than is, as a
practical matter, unavoidable." Id. at 439-40. The McAleer decision seems to indicate that
an award of retroactive competitive seniority status will burden the wrongdoing employer,
even if only indirectly, in those situations where the innocent employees seek monetary
compensation for their displacement in the competitive status hierarchy.
62 But see note 61 supra. Moreover, although it may be said that seniority rights have
been "acquired", or "earned," persuasive authority has maintained that those rights do not
vest. Therefore, the alteration or abolition of those rights can be justified. See notes 53-55
and accompanying text supra.
" This concern had been expressed earlier by courts faced with requests for alteration
or abolition of an employment or plantwide seniority system on the ground that the facially
neutral practice violated Title VII. See, e.g., Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2214 (1976), wherein it was stated that awarding
plaintiffs the relief requested "would be tantamount to shackling white employees with a
burden of past discrimination created not by them but by their employer." 502 F.2d at 1320.
But see notes 66 & 67 and accompanying text infra.
" 424 U.S. at 788-91 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting). Expressing an even harsher
criticism of the retroactive seniority award, Solicitor of Labor William Kilberg approved the
decision of the Seventh Circuit in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2214 (1976), and declared that the court therein was saying 'we
recognize there may have been a wrong committed' in layoffs, but the remedy created another
wrong." Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1974, at 27, col. 5. Upsetting the seniority system, Kilberg
continued, "doesn't look like a viable legal remedy in view of that ruling." Id.
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and the claims of the incumbent employees."5
The equitable considerations advanced by the dissent did not
go unheeded by the Franks majority. Nevertheless, Justice Brennan
forthrightly rejected such arguments on the ground that the broad
mandate of Title VII to prevent and remedy discrimination must
frequently predominate over the interests of innocent employees. 6
The Franks court reasoned, as have several circuit courts pre-
viously,67 that elimination of the wrongs violative of Title VII would
often necessarily involve some adjustment of the rights of incum-
bent employees. Moreover, the majority declared even the remedy
established by the Court's holding could not be characterized as
complete restitution or an absolute achievement of the make-whole
objective. 8 In other words, according to Justice Brennan, even with
an award of retroactive seniority credit most discriminatees will still
be in a position inferior to the position they would have achieved
had it not been for the prior discrimination. The significance of this
argument appears questionable, especially since a more complete
retroactive seniority remedy than that awarded by the Franks court
is difficult to conceive. Possibly, the Court simply meant that since
retroactive seniority will not provide complete satisfaction to the
discriminatees, it actually represents more an allocation of the bur-
den of past discrimination among all workers than the inequitable
imposition of the burden completely on the shoulders of nondiscri-
minatee employees. It is possible, however, that in speaking of more
complete relief, the majority was referring to the use of quotas to
ensure that a specified percentage of minority workers would both
1 424 U.S. at 788-91 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting). In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411
U.S. 192 (1973), the Supreme Court declared: "In equity, as nowhere else, courts eschew rigid
absolutes and look to the practical realities and necessities inescapably involved in reconcil-
ing competing interests .... " Id. at 201. In Franks, Justice Powell posited that included
among the "competing interests" inherent in a trial court's exercise of its equitable powers
under Title VII should be those of the incumbent employees. 424 U.S. at 790. Conversely,
the Franks majority held that those interests were not to be a determinative factor in the
grant or denial of relief. See note 66 and accompanying text infra.
11 424 U.S.-at 774-75. This position was aptly summarized earlier in Vogler v. McCarty,
Inc., 451 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1971), wherein the court declared:
Adequate protection of Negro rights under Title VII may necessitate, as in the
instant case, some adjustment of the rights of white employees. The Court must
be free to deal equitably with conflicting interests of white employees in order to
shape remedies that will most effectively protect and redress the rights of the Negro
victims of discrimination.
Id. at 1238-39.
"7 See, e.g., Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 451 F.2d 1236, 1238-39 (5th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 663 (2d Cir. 1971).
11 424 U.S. at 776-77. Contra, id. at 782 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
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be eligible for promotions and retain their jobs despite company
layoffs. 9 Whatever the precise characterization to be accorded the
Franks relief, it is obvious that the Supreme Court deemed a sharing
of the burden of past discrimination to be "presumptively neces-
sary" 0 and "entirely consistent with any fair characterization of
equity jurisdiction . ".. 71
In endorsing retroactive seniority as an appropriate remedy, the
Franks majority did acknowledge that since certain circumstances
may require one remedy and not another, an award of retroactive
seniority, although always available, is not required in all situa-
tions.72 Significantly, the Court did not delineate particular situa-
tions in which retroactive seniority might not be required. Rather,
Justice Brennan stressed that the choice of remedies lies, in the first
instance, with the district court." In light of this statement, Justice
" The opposition to the imposition of quotas on equitable grounds presumably would be
even greater than that presently raised against the relief afforded in Franks. A quota remedy,
rather than compensating only those individuals who had actually been victims of past
discrimination, would result in the grant of relief to minority members without requiring a
showing that they were victims of discrimination. Obviously, then, the use of quotas extends
far beyond the scope of a "make-whole" remedy, and raises serious questions of reverse
discrimination. For a discussion of the use of racial quotas as a remedy for discrimination,
see Blumrosen, Quotas, Common Sense and Law in Labor Relations: Three Dimensions of
Equal Opportunity, 27 RUTGERS L. REv. 675 (1974); Note, Constitutionality of Remedial
Minority Preferences in Employment, 56 MINN. L. REv. 842 (1972).
70 424 U.S. at 777.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 770. The concept of retroactive competitive seniority is neither novel nor unique
to Title VII actions. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) frequently awards backpay
and both types of retroactive seniority pursuant to the "affirmative actions" mandate of
§ 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970), when such measures
are deemed necessary to recreate the conditions that would have existed had there been no
unfair labor practice. See, e.g., NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 263 (1969).
Moreover, a returning veteran is entitled, upon being rehired, to the seniority status he would
have enjoyed but for his absence in military service. 38 U.S.C. § 2021 (Supp. V, 1975); see
Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 383 U.S. 225 (1966); Tilton v. Missouri P.R.R., 376 U.S. 169
(1964); Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1946). In addition to
establishing that retroactive competitive seniority is a remedy not unknown to the courts,
these analogies indicate the propriety of altering the acquired seniority rights of incumbent
employees in given situations.
In Franks, however, Justice Powell attempted to distinquish the majority's analogy to
the practice of the NLRB. Observing that the bodies entrusted with equitable discretion
pursuant to Title VII and the NLRA are the district courts and the Board respectively, Justice
Powell contended that the Franks holding stripped the district courts of their equitable
powers, and thus rendered the analogy inapposite. 424 U.S. at 798-99. This contention ap-
pears erroneous, however, inasmuch as the majority decision did not divest the district courts
of their discretionary authority, but rather sought only to declare that an award of retroactive
seniority relief is always available in Title VII actions.
11 424 U.S. 779 n.41. This portion of the decision appears to further weaken Justice
Powell's attempt to undermine the analogy between the majority's holding in favor of retroac-
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Powell's concern that the Court's holding would encroach upon the
district court's discretion to fashion appropriate relief seems unwar-
ranted. The Franks majority did suggest, however, that once the
plaintiffs demonstrate a minimum threshold requirement of actual
injury due to discriminatory hiring practices, retroactive seniority
should generally be granted. 74
CONCLUSION
A major import of the Franks decision lies in its resolution of
the confusion surrounding section 703(h). It is now clear that this
section does not bar federal courts from awarding aggrieved plain-
tiffs the seniority status they would have attained but for a prior
discriminatory refusal to hire. Furthermore, the majority's ruling
that such an award is appropriate to effectuate the make-whole
objective of Title VII provides victims of discrimination with a vital
opportunity to remedy the wrongs perpetrated against them since
the effective date of the Act. To ensure the widespread availability
of this opportunity, the Franks Court directed the district courts to
"take as their starting point the presumption in favor of rightful
place seniority relief, and proceed with further legal analysis from
that point. . . ."I Use of this presumption, strongly objected to by
the dissenting Justices, is an approach rarely employed in previous
decisions.76 Despite the projected adverse impact on incumbent
employees, it is submitted that the Franks presumption is not only
a desirable approach, but a necessary one, if the proclaimed goals
of Title VII are to receive more than lip service from the judiciary.
Notwithstanding the uncertainties clarified by the Franks deci-
sion, many questions regarding the application of retroactive senior-
ity remain to be resolved by future litigation. Foremost among these
tive seniority and the practice of the NLRB. See note 72 supra.
11 424 U.S. at 772-73. The Court suggested that to justify a denial of seniority relief for
individual class members in such situations, a defendant must satisfy the burden of proving
that the individuals who reapply for employment were not in fact victims of previous hiring
discrimination. Id. According to Justice Brennan, "[n]o reason appears. . . why the victim
rather than the perpetrator of the illegal act should bear the burden of proof on this issue."
Id. at 773 n.32.
'2 Id. at 779 n.41.
" See, e.g., Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 96
S. Ct. 2215 (1976). Although the Sixth Circuit was one of the few courts prior to Franks to
grant retroactive seniority to nonemployees who had been victims of earlier discrimination,
Meadows did not indulge in the Franks presumption in favor of rightful place seniority relief.
The court in Meadows ruled that to merit a grant of retroactive seniority, plaintiffs must
present a record surpassing the sufficiency of one entitling them to an award of backpay. 510
F.2d at 949.
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is the delineation of the circumstances in which a retroactive senior-
ity award is inappropriate. Consistent with its decision to leave the
choice of remedy to the district courts, the Franks majority declined
to establish definitive guidelines for determining the appropriate-
ness of this relief in particular situations.7 The only directive it did
issue, and admittedly it is a highly significant one, was that the
competing interests of the incumbent employees are not to be
determinative in evaluating the appropriateness of the remedy.
Trial courts now face the task of establishing viable standards
of proof for ascertaining whether the individuals requesting retroac-
tive seniority were, in fact, victims of previous discrimination." It
is submitted that the criteria should include factors such as age and
residence, and, where relevant, special skills and job qualifications.
Thus, once seniority has been granted to the class as a whole, if a
defendant company can prove that certain individuals seeking sen-
iority relief as members of that class were not old enough or within
sufficient geographic proximity to work for the company, or that
they lacked valid qualifications required for the job at the time of
application, it would appear that the reason for their nonemploy-
ment with the defendant company was not a discriminatory refusal
to hire. An award of retroactive seniority to such an individual
would not be warranted.
Furthermore, since the retroactive seniority relief provided for
in the Franks decision is calculated from the date of application for
employment, a question immediately arises concerning those indi-
viduals who were dissuaded from applying for employment because
they knew of the employer's discriminatory hiring practices. When
confronted with this dilemma, lower courts have held that the ab-
sence of a formal employment application does not rebut the infer-
" The Franks Court noted:
[Wie do not in any way modify our previously expressed view that the statutory
scheme of Title VII "implicitly recognizes that there may be cases calling for one
remedy but not another, and-owing to the structure of the federal judiciary-these
choices are, of course, left in the first instance to the district courts."
424 U.S. at 779, quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975).
1, Although proof of discrimination must be submitted if the defendant contends that a
particular class member was not a victim of prior discrimination, an inability to precisely
prove "damages" will not necessarily .preclude an award of retroactive seniority to that class
member. This principle was suggested earlier by the Court when it held that "'the constant
tendency of the courts is to find some way in which damages can be awarded where a wrong
has been done. Difficulty of ascertainment is no longer confused with right of recovery.'"
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1931), quoting
Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 297 F. 791, 802 (2d Cir. 1924).
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ence of discrimination" since it was probable that the potential
employees realized that they would not be hired."s Computation of
a seniority award for an individual in this situation could probably
be made on the basis of age, with the court granting seniority status
equivalent to that of the average worker of the same age."'
Conceivably, the problems left unresolved by Franks can be
surmounted if the district courts, rather than narrowly construing
the Franks holding, opt to interpret it as a broad endorsement of
retroactive seniority relief. It is to be hoped, however, that the far-
reaching significance of the Franks decision does not foreclose in-
quiry into worksharing,2 pay cuts,83 shorter work weeks," and other
alternative methods of relief.8 5
Rosemary T. Berkery
See, e.g., United States v. Navajo Freight Lines, 525 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1975); Rodri-
guez v. East Tex. Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 63-64 (5th Cir. 1974); Bing v. Roadway Express,
Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 450-52 (5th Cir. 1973); cf. Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431
F.2d 245, 247 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971).
' A recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit contained the following
observation:
It is our view that. . . the most fair seniority adjustment consistent with "rightful
place" is that which permits a carryover from the date the discriminatee would
have qualified but for the discrimination. To restrict the carryover to that which
would have accrued from the date of application or protest ignores the Biblically
recognized claims of the meek ....
United States v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 525 F.2d 1318, 1326 (9th Cir. 1975).
See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 7, at 1636.
" Because worksharing would presumably diminish resort to layoffs and foreclose resort
to court suits, its use has been endorsed by the EEOC. Moreover, during a period of economic
decline, worksharing would appear to be an especially viable alternative. One author has
recently suggested, however, that this alternative "has lately fallen into disfavor, not because
it is impracticable under conditions of modern industry, but because of the rise of unemploy-
ment compensation." Poplin, Fair Employment in a Depressed Economy: The Layoff
Problem, 23 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 177, 221 (1975). For an analysis of the implications of workshar-
ing as a remedy, see Wood, Equal Employment Opportunity and Seniority: Rights in
Conflict, 26 LAa. L.J. 345, 347-48 (1975).
41 Myriad groups of employees have accepted pay cuts as an alternative to the layoff of
their fellow workers. See Raskin, Painful Choice for Labor: Pay or Jobs, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9,
1975, § 3 (Business and Finance), at 1, cols. 1-3.
' See id.
Suggested methods have included reduction or elimination of overtime work and early
voluntary retirement. See Developments in Industrial Relations-U.S. Delays Bias Decision
on Layoffs, 98 MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1975, at 64.
